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Abstract:
This briefing paper provides an overview of the existing European Union approach to
issues of security, counter-terrorism, and organised crime. In particular, it focuses on
the role of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in the formation of policy and in the
development of new institutions and institutional arrangements within the EU, and the
influence of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).
The paper argues that steps should be taken to streamline and rationalise the existing
structures concerned with security, counter-terrorism and organised crime, and
strongly recommends that a “Committee on Internal Security” be established to act as
a single point of reference and clearinghouse for the work of the various EU agencies
and institutions concerned with security, counter-terrorism and organised crime.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This briefing paper provides an overview of the existing European Union approach to
issues of security, counter-terrorism, and organised crime. In particular, it focuses on
the role of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in the formation of policy and the
development of new institutions and institutional arrangements within the EU, and the
influence of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).

Based on the evidence presented in this paper, it appears clear that the ESS has played
a major role in improving awareness of the need for greater coordination between EU
and national agencies as regards the promotion of security, counter-terrorism activity,
and the investigation and prosecution of organised crime. Given that the EU has no
formal powers to mandate how individual Member States address these issues, the
ESS has proved to be an effective mechanism for promoting collaborative efforts
between Member States and the EU, and has led to the strengthening of a number of
existing EU institutions, including Europol. Likewise, the OCTA has led to increased
awareness of the problem of organised crime in the EU, and has helped to foster
information sharing and police cooperation across Member States.

Despite these successes, the EU approach to security, counter-terrorism and organised
crime remains fragmented and characterised by high levels of bureaucracy,
inefficiency, and institutional inertia. In part, this stems from the fact that no single
agency or individual currently has responsibility for these matters. Although the
introduction of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has led to some improvements in
this area, he has struggled to provide the sort of overarching management and
strategic planning required by the ESS. Furthermore, the reluctance of individual
Member States to grant additional powers or commit additional resources to agencies
like Europol has meant that the EU has been limited in its ability to provide the sort of
central support and guidance that is clearly needed.

In light of these and other concerns, this briefing paper recommends that steps be
taken to streamline and rationalise the existing structures concerned with security,
counter-terrorism and organised crime. Given the number of agencies either directly
or indirectly involved in the gathering of information, the production of intelligence,
5

and the development of policy, it is extremely difficult for the EU to develop
strategies that go beyond the most general statements of intent and calls for greater
cooperation between Member States. With this point in mind, this briefing paper
concludes by strongly recommending the creation of a central “Committee on Internal
Security”, which can act as an single point of reference and clearinghouse for the
work of the various EU agencies and institutions concerned with security, as well as
provide the sort of direction and policy coordination that is currently needed.

6

Introduction
In the aftermath of the events of September 11th in the United States and subsequent
terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, there has been growing recognition within the
European Union of the need for Member States to work more closely on matters of
security and policing. In addition, in recent years organised crime has come to be
regarded by many as a key threat to the internal security of the EU, and a problem that
requires a coordinated and concerted response from Member States.

This briefing paper provides an overview of institutional arrangements and policies
that have been developed within the European Union to respond to the dual threats of
terrorism and organised crime. In particular, this paper focuses on the relationships
between the various agencies responsible for monitoring and generating intelligence
on terrorism and organised crime, and suggests a number of ways in which existing
intelligence sharing and operational practices might be improved.

For the sake of clarity and accessibility, this briefing paper is divided into three main
sections. Section One considers the development and major aims of the European
Security Strategy, and provides an overview of the key institutions and arrangements
involved in its implementation. Section Two then examines the role played by
Europol and other EU agencies in the fight against organised crime and the
development of the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). In addition, this
section considers the role played by a range of other EU and national institutions in
the promotion of security and the policing of organised crime. Finally, Section Three
concludes the report by identifying some of the key challenges facing the existing
security and policing framework.

7

Section One: Security and Counter-Terrorism in the EU

1.1 The European Security Strategy (ESS)

At the heart of the European Union’s approach to questions of security and the threat
of terrorism is the European Security Strategy (ESS).1 Drafted by the EU’s High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Janvier Solana, the
policy was adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2003. The product
of the collective thinking and shared experiences of the Member States, the strategy
establishes a common approach to questions of security and sets out three clear
objectives:

(1) to identify global challenges and key threats to the security of the EU;
(2) to build security in the EU neighbourhood; and
(3) to promote an international order based on effective multilateralism as regards
matters of security.

In the five years since it was first adopted, the ESS has come to be regarded as a
central component of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and as such
it informs much of the activity that takes place within the EU under the auspices of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar. As has been noted by Professor
François Heisbourg of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it is important
to recognise, however, that the ESS is not a strategy in the traditional sense. It does
not, for example, contain a detailed list of recommendations or set out a specific
programme of action. Instead, it presents what might best be described as—in the
words of Professor Heisbourg—a vision for the future of European security policy:

It analyses the world and then goes on to state its vision of the manner in
which the EU could present itself within that world… But it is not a strategy in

1

European Council (2003), European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better
World, Brussels, 12 December 2003,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
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the sense that it says: here are the means towards the end and this is how we
are going to deploy those means towards those ends.2

Despite this fact, the ESS has become an important touchstone for those parts of the
Council and Commission concerned with issues of security and organised crime.3
According to a recent report on the implementation of the ESS, the strategy has
provided the basis for the development of a range of measures that have made it easier
to pursue investigations across borders and to coordinate criminal prosecutions.4 In
particular, the report notes that since the strategy was first adopted, the European
Union has developed a number of other more specific programmes and strategies,
including the Hague Programme in 2004 and a new Strategy for the External
Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs in 2005.5 In addition, there is a new EU
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which advocates a four-pronged approach to security and
anti-terrorism: preventing radicalism; protecting targets; pursuing terrorists; and
responding to the aftermaths of attacks.6 This EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy has also
led to the appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC), who is responsible

2

Heisbourg as quoted in UK House of Lords European Union Committee (2008),
Adapting the EU’s Approach to Today’s Security Challenges: The Review of the 2003
European Security Strategy, 31st Report of Session 2007–08, HL Paper 190 (hereafter
HL (2008) ESS Report), p. 9. This view was echoed by the then UK Minister for
Europe, Jim Murphy MP, in his evidence to the House of Lords. According to Mr
Murphy, the ESS is “a political declaration of intent about what Member States are
willing to collectively enter into to support and protect their own and other
populations… [I]t is not a legal document so it will always rely on political will” (p.
9).
3

Ibid, p. 16.

4

High Representative for CFSP (December 2008), Report on the Implementation of
the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World – Council
document S407/08, endorsed at the European Council on 11-12 December 2008
(hereafter EC (2008) ESS Report), p. 4.
5

European Council (November 2004), The Hague Programme: Strengthening
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union - OJ C 53 of 3 March 2005
A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
COM(2005) 491.
6

European Council (2005), The European Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Brussels, 30
November 144469/4/05.
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for overseeing the European response to terrorism and makes recommendations to the
European Council.7

1.2 Improving Coordination between Key EU Agencies

One of the main successes of the ESS has been improving the levels of coordination
between key EU agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Although the EU does not
play a direct role in counter-terrorism operations, under the auspices of the ESS it has
been able to provide Member States with access to an increasingly sophisticated
network of information and intelligence services. Both Europol and Eurojust have
seen their roles expand since the adoption of the ESS, with the result that there is now
greater operational coordination between the anti-terrorism activities of Member
States and a more coherent approach to the development of domestic security
policies.8

More crucially, the ESS has also led to an expansion in the role of the EU Joint
Situation Centre (SitCen). Previously focused on assessing external threats to EU
security, it now also receives information and intelligence from Member States on
internal threats, particularly those associated with terrorism. The creation in February
2005 of a dedicated counter-terrorism division within its existing Civilian Intelligence
Cell (CIC) has given SitCen the capacity to assess threats to transport and other parts
of the critical infrastructure within the EU, as well as the ability to monitor trends in
terrorist financing.9 Since 2005, SitCen has produced a series of intelligence-based
reports for both the Council and the Commission, which have helped to inform and
shape the development of EU policy in relation to counter-terrorism while also

7

European Council (2008), Discussion Paper on EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 19 November 2008, 15983/08
(hereafter EC (2008) Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator).
8

EC (2008) ESS Report (fn 4 above).

9

SitCen is currently divided into three main units: the Civilian intelligence Cell
(CIC), which produces political and counter-terrorism assessment; the General
Operations Unit (GOU), which operational support, research and non-intelligence
analysis to Member States; and the Communications Unit, which deals with
communications security and is responsible for the Council's communications centre
(ComCen).
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providing a firm foundation for cooperative operations and intelligence sharing
between Member States.

Finally, the introduction of the ESS—which explicitly recognises the threat posed to
EU security by organised crime—has led to various initiatives designed to improve
the ability of EU institutions and Member States to respond to the challenges of
organised crime. The most notable of these has been the introduction of the annual
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OTCA), which is produced by Europol with
contributions from Member States and key EU institutions such as the European
Central Bank (ECB), European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(ECMDDA), Eurojust, Frontex, and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). The
development of the OCTA will be discussed in the next section, alongside an
overview of the key EU institutions involved in the prevention and prosecution of
organised crime.

1.3 Successes and Challenges

The introduction of the ESS has undoubtedly raised awareness at all levels within the
EU of the need for a more coordinated and efficient approach to matters of security,
counter-terrorism, and organised crime. Although it does not provide a detailed “roadmap” for the development of policies per se, the vision it sets out has clearly
influenced the development of policy since 2003 and led to the creation of new
security institutions and the strengthening of existing agencies within the EU. Most
recently, the influence of the ESS can be seen in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Council’s adoption of conclusions on the principle of convergence. These
conclusions, which provide guidance on operational cooperation between Member
States’ law-enforcement services, were discussed by the JHA Council at a meeting on
24 October 2008 and aim to improve cooperation among Member States by
promoting harmonisation of equipment and practice, joint action and legal
frameworks.

There is, however, an inherent tension at the centre of this aspirational (as opposed to
prescriptive) approach to EU security, terrorism, and organised crime. Although there
is clearly a collective interest in improving EU security and fostering greater
11

cooperation between Member States when it comes to matters of terrorism and
organised crime, ultimately security and law enforcement are pursued at a national
level. As a consequence, while the ESS has enjoyed broad support, Member States
have nonetheless maintained control over nearly all aspects of their operational
responses to security and criminal threats within the EU. Furthermore, Member States
have thus far been largely unwilling to grant greater powers of investigation or
prosecution to agencies like Europol or to increase the level of resources they
currently provide in support of EU-level security and anti-terrorism activities. Instead,
they have tended to act bilaterally when it comes to cross-border investigations,
sharing information and intelligence on an ad hoc basis or in accordance with
longstanding bilateral agreements.

This fact was recently acknowledged by the Council in a report on the implementation
of the ESS.10 While noting that the EU has made substantial progress in the area of
security and organised crime in the last five years, the report concedes that there is
still much to be done and that the ESS remains a work in progress. More specifically,
the report openly states that there are still substantial improvements to be made in
terms of coordination, both between the agencies of the EU and between the EU and
Member States:

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external
dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed
across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already
identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.11

In part, the problem of coordination stems from the fact that a wide range of
institutions and agencies are involved in the development of security and antiterrorism policy at the EU level.12 Although the introduction of a Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator was a positive step, the Coordinator’s task has been made especially

10

EC (2008) ESS Report (fn 4 above).

11

Ibid, p. 4.

12

For a detailed analysis of this problem, see Keohane, Daniel (2005), “The EU and
Counter-terrorism”, Centre for European Reform Report, pp. 17–22.
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difficult by the sheer number of bodies he is required to deal with. In addition to
Europol and Eurojust, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is also responsible for
harmonising the activities of the terrorism working group (composed of national
interior ministry officials), the foreign policy ‘working group on terrorism’
(composed of national foreign ministry officials), and the Police Chiefs’ Task Force.
As has been argued by the Centre for European Reform, however, this situation is far
from desirable and could have been avoided had Europol been given clear leadership
on matters of security and counter-terrorism within the EU.13

The challenges facing Europol and the development of a more coordinated approach
to matters of security and anti-terrorism have unfortunately been exacerbated by the
continuing uncertainty surrounding the future of the Lisbon Treaty. One of the
expected consequences of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is the application of
Article 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European Union (TFEU), which
aims to make Europol more accountable to the European Parliament and national
Parliaments.14 Until these proposals are implemented and the detailed regulations
governing the scrutiny of Europol are introduced, the institution is unlikely to be able
to make any substantial progress in terms of expanding its coordinating role.

13

As noted in 2005 report of the Centre for European Reform, however, Europol has
not been able to assume this role due to the reluctance of national police forces and
intelligence agencies to share information with Europol. Keohane, ibid, p. 20.
14

According to the text of Article 88 (originally Article III-276 of the Constitution
Treaty):
1. Europol’s mission shall be to support and strengthen action by the Member States’
police authorities and other law enforcement services and their mutual cooperation in
preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism
and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy.
2. The European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations adopted in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Europol’s structure,
operation, field of action and tasks. These tasks may include:
a) the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information, in
particular that forwarded by the authorities of the Member States or third countries or
bodies;
b) the coordination, organisation and implementation of investigative and operational
action carried out jointly with the Member States’ competent authorities or in the
context of joint investigative teams, where appropriate in liaison with Eurojust.
These regulations shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol’s activities
by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments.
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Section Two: Organised Crime: The European Criminal Intelligence Model
(ECIM) and the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA)

As has already been noted, one of the products of the ESS has been the development
of a more coordinated approach to the problem of organised crime in the EU. In
addition to providing a basis for the development of the European Criminal
Intelligence Model (ECIM), the ESS has also led to a greater leadership role for
Europol in detection and prevention of organised crime and to increased recognition
for the work done by Eurojust. In the following sections, the work of Europol and
Eurojust will be examined, with particular attention on the development of the ECIM
and more recently the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA).

2.1 Europol and Eurojust

Established under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Europol first became fully
operational in 1999 (following ratification of the Europol Convention in 1998).
Within the EU, Europol is the lead institution on matters of criminal intelligence; it
exists to facilitate cooperation between national law enforcement agencies and to
assist Member States in combating serious organised crime and terrorism.15 In
practice, Europol provides a central hub for the sharing of information on organised
crime and terrorism between Member States, while also producing its own
intelligence briefings and analyses of crime trends.16
15

According to Article 3 of the Europol Convention (1998), Europol’s principal tasks
are: (1) to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States; (2) to
obtain, collate, and analyse information and intelligence; (3) to notify the competent
authorities of the Member States without delay via the national units referred to in
Article 4 of information concerning them and of any connections identified between
criminal offences; (4) to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all
relevant information to the national units; and (5) to maintain a computerised system
of collected information containing data in accordance with Articles 8, 10 and 11 of
the Convention.
16

Bradley, Hugo (2008), “Europol and the European Criminal Intelligence Model: A
Non-state Response to Organized Crime”, Policing 2(1): 103–9 (hereafter Bradley
(2008) Europol and the ECIM), p. 106. Note that Article 6 of the Europol Convention
sets out a clear legal framework for the exchange and analysis of information about
crime and terrorism in the EU; it requires Europol to maintain both a computerised
14

Europol is not a police force in the traditional sense: its officers cannot, for example,
make arrests or initiate investigations. Since its inception, it has therefore largely
focused on improving its analytical capacity and providing informal leadership on
matters of transnational crime and terrorism within the EU. Aside from hosting
regular meetings of the European Police Chief’s Taskforce (PCTF)—which provides
planning assistance for joint operations against organised crime networks within the
EU—Europol also works closely with multi-state police teams organised under the
Comprehensive Operational Strategic Planning for the Police (COSPOL) framework.

Given that Europol is almost entirely dependent on information received from
Member States, it inevitably relies heavily on the support of national policing
agencies in order to fulfil its core objectives. As Hugo Bradley of the Centre for
European Reform has recently observed, Europol has had to work hard to prove its
worth and has still to gain the trust of some Member States and their domestic law
enforcement agencies.17 In part, this task has not been made any easier by the
bureaucratic structure within which Europol has been forced to operate. As Bradley
notes:

Even minor administrative decisions of [Europol’s] director need the
unanimous approval of all twenty-seven EU countries represented on its
management board. Moreover, under the Convention, Europol analysts and
ordinary police officers can only work together via liaison officers in The
Hague, themselves working through special units based in national capitals.
The result can be bureaucratic standstill.18

It has been agreed that Europol will be converted into a full EU agency as of 1
January 2010, which will make amending the legislation governing its remit and

information system (the Europol Information System [EIS]) and analysis work files
(AWFs).
17

Bradley, ibid, p. 107.

18

Ibid, p. 108.
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procedures more straightforward and less time consuming.19 At their meeting in April
2008, JHA Ministers reached a political agreement for a Council Decision conferring
EU agency status to Europol as of January 2010. The Council Decision, which will
replace the current Europol Convention, has not adopted yet - due to some
parliamentary reservations. Intergovernmental financing will be replaced with
Community financing. Europol's mandate will be extended to cover all serious forms
of cross-border crime.
In addition to Europol, the EU also relies on Eurojust to aid in the investigation and
prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime. An EU agency, Eurojust was
established in 2002 and provides a forum for prosecutors and judicial authorities from
Member States to share information and expertise, with a view to producing a more
coordinated response to serious and organised crime within the EU. Eurojust also
works closely with national agencies to assist in the extradition of suspects and the
sharing of evidence between Member States, often helping to draft and implement
bilateral agreements between Member States. In December 2008, the Council adopted
a Decision on the strengthening of Eurojust - amending Decision 2002/187/JHA
setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime.
Like Europol, Eurojust was originally intended to enhance cooperation and improve
efficiency within the EU by providing a central point of reference for all cross-border
investigations and prosecutions within the EU. Although its caseload has grown
steadily since its inception, to date Eurojust appears to have suffered less from
problems of bureaucracy and lack of trust than Europol.20 It is almost universally
regarded as an improvement on the previous system of coordinating multi-country
prosecutions, which was administered under the authority of the Council of Europe.21

In simple terms, Europol and Eurojust provide the main institutional structure for the
investigation and prosecution of serious and organised crime in the EU. Because they
are still relatively young organisations, they are both still in the process of gaining the
19

JHA
Council
Press
Release,
Brussels,
18
April
2008,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/610&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr).
20

Eurojust Annual Report, 2006, p.24.

21

Bradley (2008) Europol and the ECIM (fn 16 above), p.106.
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trust of Member States and establishing effective and efficient working arrangements
with their national partners and other EU institutions. In recent years, a number of key
initiatives have been developed to enhance the work done by these two institutions,
most notably the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) and the Organised
Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). Both of these initiatives have their origins in
decisions taken under the Hague Programme in November 2004, most notably to
promote intelligence-led policing practices within Member States and to produce
high-quality threat assessments that can be used to guide both EU and national
policing policies and strategies. An overview and analysis of the ECIM and the
OCTA are provided in the following two sections.

2.2 The European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM)

The European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) was agreed by a meeting of
European Interior Ministers in 2005. It sets out a new strategy for the sharing of
information between the law enforcement agencies of Member States and Europol.
Drawing heavily on the ideas of intelligence-led policing (as developed in the United
Kingdom and the United States), the ECIM stresses the importance of producing joint
assessments of serious and organised crime, based on shared intelligence and direct
input from national police forces within the EU.22 According to the ECIM, threat
assessment should be constructed according to the following four steps:

(1) Police forces of Member States share information and intelligence with Europol.
(2) Europol drafts an assessment of the overall level of threat facing the EU.
(3) This assessment provides the basis for a Council of Ministers agreement on joint
law enforcement priorities between the Member States.

22

As noted in a recent UK House of Lords report on Europol, the ECIM was directly
influenced by the National Intelligence Model (NIM) used in the United Kingdom (as
set out in the Code of Practice on the NIM issued in January 2005 by the UK Home
Secretary). UK House of Lords European Union Committee (2008), Europol:
Coordinating the Fight against Serious and Organised Crime, 29th Report of Session
2007–08, HL Paper 183 (hereafter HL (2008) Europol Report), p. 26.
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(4) EU police chiefs implement joint operations in line with the Council of Ministers
agreement and then relay any information and intelligence that they generate back
to Europol (which can then use the information for future threat assessments).23

Although it has been suggested that some Member States and national police forces
have yet to fully embrace the ECIM, there appears to be broad agreement that the
model has helped to harmonise policing practices across the EU and to introduce
“modern” intelligence-led strategic planning. In their evidence to a recent UK House
of Lords report on Europol, representatives of the UK’s Serious and Organised Crime
Organisation (SOCA) stated:

[T]he ECIM/OTCA model is ushering in a new phase in the development of
Europol, establishing the agency as a central intelligence base in the EU
supporting a range of sub-regional initiatives around the EU. This approach is
exactly in line with our aspirations for the organisation.24

The success of the ECIM is reflected in the influence that it has had on the 2009
Europol Work Programme.25 Although no specific reference is made to the ECIM in
the document, the Programme repeatedly refers to decisions taken by the JHA
Council in October 2005 and to the importance of intelligence-led policing. It is also
important to note that the ECIM has provided the basis for another key initiative,
namely the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), which is discussed below.

2.3 The Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA)

Prior to 2006, there was no mechanism within the EU for the production of forwardlooking assessments of the threat posed to Member States by serious and organised
crime. Although Europol produced an annual Organised Crime Report (OCR), it was
backward looking, largely descriptive, and based on historical statistical data. In 2004,
however, the Hague Programme instructed Europol to produce the first Organised

23

Bradley (2008) Europol and the ECIM (fn 16 above), p. 107.

24

HL (2008) Europol Report (fn 22 above), p. 28.

25

European Council (2008), Europol Work Programme 2009, Document 7801/08.
18

Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) as part of its effort to promote intelligence-led
policing practices within the EU. Designed to complement the ECIM, the OCTA is an
annual document produced on the basis of information and intelligence supplied to
Europol by Member States. It aims to guide the policing priorities of Member States
via the Police Chief Task Force (PCTF/COSPOL) framework and through direct
distribution of the assessment document to law enforcement agencies at a national
level. According to the introduction to the 2008 OCTA,

To support decision-makers in the best possible way, the OCTA provides a
well-targeted, qualitative assessment of the threat from organised crime. The
OCTA is based on a multi-source approach, including law enforcement and
non-law enforcement contributions.26

These contributions are drawn from a wide array of EU-level and national institutions,
including: the European Central Bank; the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
Drug Addiction (ECMDDA); Eurojust; Frontex; and the European Anti-Fraud Office
(OLAF). In addition, the OCTA draws on information provided by countries outside
the EU and on international law enforcement organisations such as the International
Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol).

At a practical level, the OCTA aims to ensure that police operations conducted by
Member States are driven by strategically relevant intelligence and that the
appropriate law enforcement instruments are used.27 For the most part, the OCTA
appears to be succeeding in this aim, although some commentators have questioned
whether the information being provided via the Assessments is having the desired
effect on operational practices. According to Dr Nicholas Ridley of the John Grieve
Centre in London, while the OCTA is “a magnificent tour de force from an academic,
strategic analysis point of view … the unfortunate thing is that OCTA is not really
operationally oriented.”28 This is problem that has been at least partly acknowledged

26

Europol (2008), EU Organised Crime Assessment (OCTA), p. 9.

27

Ibid.

28

Evidence to the UK House of Lords. See HL (2008) Europol Report (fn 22 above),
p. 28.
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by Europol itself, with the introduction to the 2008 OCTA noting that “the OTCA
itself is not detailed enough to pinpoint specific criminal investigations.”29

The development of the OTCA also appears to have been hampered by the fact that
some Member States seem unwilling to provide the required information and
intelligence to Europol. As Bradley has noted, while in 2006 one Member State
submitted over 500 pages of criminal intelligence to the first OCTA, another
contributed only “a single page”.30 In addition, because the OTCA does not include
any assessment of terrorist threats, it can be argued that it is only of limited use to
Member States as regards the development of comprehensive law enforcement and
security strategies.

2.4 Centralising Control or Creating Channels?

One of the key questions that needs to be asked about the current EU approach to
organised crime is whether it is designed to encourage greater centralisation or instead
to lead to the dispersal of investigative and preventative functions. Put another way,
there appears to be a developing tension between the desire to give Europol (and
Eurojust) a more prominent role in the development and coordination of EU-wide
responses to serious and organised crime on the one hand, and the stated aim of
enabling Member States and national agencies to produce better informed local
strategies on the other hand. This is a tension that is exacerbated by the fact that
Europol is unable to gather information for itself or to generate intelligence without
direct input from Member States—in reality, it is ultimately Member States and
national law enforcement bodies that are responsible for investigating and prosecuting
those responsible for serious and organised crime.

This problem has been recognised by Hugo Bradley of the Centre for European
Reform, who has rightly counselled against greater centralisation of cross-border
policing functions. According to Bradley, further efforts in this direction are likely to
be hampered by intractable differences in policing and prosecutorial practices across
29

Europol (2008), EU Organised Crime Assessment (OCTA), p. 9.

30

Bradley (2008) Europol and the ECIM (fn 16 above), p. 107.
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Member States and by Europol’s lack of investigatory powers. Instead, Bradley
argues that the EU should continue to focus on encouraging Member States to “buy
into” the existing ECIM, foster informal as well as formal mechanisms of
cooperation, and work towards ensuring that the EU becomes a “focal point for the
emergence of a new pan-European community of police officers.”31

These suggestions are particularly apposite when one considers that how little time
the existing EU policing structure has had to develop. It is reasonable to think that
building trust in institutions such as Europol and Eurojust will take considerable time,
and as such there is a strong argument for ensuring that progress in this area should be
steady and incremental.

31

Ibid, p. 108.
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3. Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the overview provided in this briefing paper, it is possible to identify a
number of key areas of concern regarding the current approach taken by the EU to
matters of security, organised crime, and counter-terrorism. The following
conclusions and recommendations are intended to provide guidance to the European
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on how
to address these concerns and to suggest possible areas for future research and action.

Before moving to the specific recommendations, is it important to draw attention to
the lack of available evidence on the operational practices and effectiveness of the
various institutions discussed in this briefing paper. Despite the fact that Europol
produces an annual report and publishes the yearly OCTA, there is very little detailed
information available in the public domain about its workings or its relationship with
specific Member States or national law enforcement agencies. Although it is not
surprising, given the sensitive nature of the work undertaken by Europol, this lack of
transparency needs to be addressed if Europol (and Eurojust) are to play an enhanced
role in the provision of security and policing services across the EU. Public as well as
institutional confidence in such institutions is vital for their long-term success, and
they should therefore endeavour to provide as much information—in easily
understandable and accessible forms—to the public as possible. In addition, it is clear
that there has been very little in the way of independent research into the operation of
the ECIM and the development of the OTCA. Given their central importance to the
overall EU security and policing strategy, this is regrettable—and a deficiency that
LIBE and other relevant EU bodies should consider rectifying in the future (either by
encouraging and sponsoring such research or by facilitating access to relevant
institutions by independent researchers and research organisations).

3.1 Recommendation One: The Need for Simplicity and Transparency

As even this short briefing paper demonstrates, the current EU structure for the
investigation and prevention of organised crime and terrorism is extremely complex.
Aside from the fact that this complexity may make it more difficult for individuals
and agencies within Member States to access the full range of law-enforcement and
22

intelligence services provided by the EU, this complex arrangement also increases the
likelihood that information will not be effectively or efficiently shared between
various EU institutions or between the EU and Member States. As such, there is a
pressing need for a comprehensive review of the existing structures, with a view to
rationalising the relationships between the various institutions responsible for
security, serious crime and terrorism and making the operation of these institutions
more transparent.

3.2 Recommendation Two: A Committee on Internal Security

Building on Recommendation One, the European Parliament should welcome the
possibility - foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty - of establishing a "Committee on Internal
Security", which would have overarching responsibility for developing policy and
coordinating EU efforts in relation to security, serious crime, and terrorism. Article 71
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states: "A standing
Committee shall be set up within the Council in order to ensure that operational
cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union".
Establishing such a Committee would not only provide a strong basis for greater
coordination of existing EU institutions (such as Europol and Eurojust) but also make
the structure more readily accessible to Member States and their national law
enforcement agencies.32 It has already been suggested that a single European lawenforcement coordination body comprised of Europol, Eurojust, and the Police
Chief’s Task Force (PCTF/COSPOL) could provide the basis for such a committee,33
32

Although the primary function of this Committee would be to enhance police
cooperation within the EU, ideally it would also act as a point of contact for third
party, non-EU law enforcement agencies.
33

Ibid. It is worth noting that in response to a request from the JHA Council
(Document 9718/08), Europol and Eurojust have recently amended their cooperation
agreement. Furthermore, in a discussion paper produced by the Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator in November 2008, the CTC notes that “detailed provisions on the
exchange of information have been included [in the draft agreement] with the aim to
facilitate a systematic, reciprocal and timely flow of information between the two
bodies and to improve Eurojust’s involvement in Europol’s Analysis Work Files”. EC
(2008) Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (fn 7 above), p. 4. The work of
this Committee could also be considerably enhanced by ensuring that it has a formal
relationship with the European Defence Agency (which would provide the basis for
joint policy development and the exchange of information).
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and this briefing paper strongly suggests that the European Parliament should
consider the feasibility of such a merger and the potential advantages of such an
approach.34 In addition, the EP should also consider whether other agencies – such as
the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) and the European Data Protection Supervisor
(EDPS) – could be involved in the activities of the Committee (or at the very least
oversee its work in an advisory capacity).

3.3 Recommendation Three: A Coordinated Approach to Data Sharing

The final recommendation of this briefing paper is to suggest that the European
Parliament should consider providing increased support to Europol and the CounterTerrorism Coordinator as they assess the implications of the Swedish Framework
Decision35 and the Prüm Decision36 for information sharing within the existing EU
policing structures. Formally adopted into EU law in 2008, the Prüm Decision
introduces a range of reforms to existing data sharing practices. Given that data
sharing and the exchange of intelligence is at the heart of the ECIM and OCTA,
careful thought must be given to how best to implement these provisions, with a view
to ensuring that they enhance rather than impede cooperation. To this end, the
European Parliament should whenever possible encourage independent research into
the likely effects of the Prüm Decision on data sharing within the EU and address the
specific concerns raised by the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator concerning the future
governance of EU information exchange.37 Furthermore, consideration should also be

34

It should be noted that the establishment of such a body may go some way towards
meeting the concerns of Member States such as Austria, which has called for greater
operational coordination within the EU and the establishment of an “internal security
architecture”. See Resolution of the Austrian Parliament (2001), Security and Defence
Doctrine, http://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=3604. Ideally, this body would
also include a representative from the European Defence Agency (or at least have a
formal relationship with the agency which could provide the basis for joint policy
development and exchange of information).

35

JHA Council Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the
exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the
Member States of the European Union.
36

JHA Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of crossborder cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime.
37

EC (2008) Report of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (fn 7 above), p. 4.
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given to the possible role that could be played by the Fundamental Rights Agency
(FRA) in the development of any data sharing regulations or governance
arrangements. The development of the EU’s security and policing structures is still in
its early stages, and by providing this support the European Parliament will be making
a substantial contribution to the creation of a more effective and efficient approach to
the problems of organised crime and terrorism.
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